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TALKING ABOUT PROSECUTORS
Alafair S. Burke*

INTRODUCTION

I recently saw my former law school ethics professor for the first
time in fifteen years. After I reintroduced myself to her, she asked what
I had been doing since graduation. I had barely gotten out the initial
words-I was a prosecutor-before hearing her response: Morally
compromised, were you?
I took no more offense at her gentle ribbing than intended, but the
exchange made me think about the way criminal law scholars talk about
prosecutors. The literature is rife with stories of prosecutors who
knowingly engage in unethical behavior-who overcharge questionable
cases to pressure defendants to enter guilty pleas, make prejudicial and
misleading statements to both judges and juries, and, most routinely of
all, withhold exculpatory evidence that might undermine their
impressive conviction rates. In the prevailing narrative of the scholarly
literature on wrongful convictions,' stories of bad prosecutorial
3
2
decision-making in the cases against Genarlow Wilson, the Jena Six,
* Visiting Professor, Fordham Law School; Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty
Research, Hofstra Law School. I would like to thank Ellen Yaroshefsky for organizing the
conference that inspired this Symposium, and the editors of the Cardozo Law Review for inviting
my contribution.
I The focus here is on the traditional scholarly literature on wrongful convictions, as opposed
to the wrongful convictions movement itself, where practicing lawyers and Innocence Projects
have noted the advantages of a more inclusive rhetoric. See Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting
Innocence Reform: Wisconsin's New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 645, 708-10
(noting the use of "the rhetoric of systemic problems and collective responsibility" by Wisconsin
Innocence Project codirectors, Keith Findley and John Pray).
2 Genarlow Wilson was a seventeen-year-old boy who engaged in consensual sexual contact
with a fifteen-year-old girl. Prosecutors charged him with several offenses, but the jury convicted
him only of aggravated child molestation, for which consent was no defense. Humphrey v.
Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 2007); Shaila Dewan, GeorgiaMan Fights Conviction as Molester,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2006, at A22. Scholars and commentators have widely condemned the
prosecutors who appealed a court's ruling that a ten-year sentence in the case constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline
UnethicalProsecutors,36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 275, 305-06 (2007).
3 For discussion and critique of the prosecution of six African-American high school
students in Jena, Louisiana, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecutingthe Jena Six, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1285 (2008); Andrew E. Taslitz & Carol Steiker, Introduction to the Symposium: The Jena
Six, the ProsecutorialConscience, and the Dead Hand of History, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
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and three Duke lacrosse players 4 are merely high-profile examples of
prosecutorial misconduct that happens every day in America's
prosecutors' offices and courtrooms. What emerges from the current
discourse on wrongful convictions is a language of fault-fault placed
on prosecutors who fail to value justice at each turn of the proceedings.
I come to a consideration of the discourse we use to discuss
prosecutors with my own perspective. I clerked for a judge who had
earned a reputation as "a high-powered icon of liberalism" on the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 5 As a prosecutor, I worked to develop nonpunitive responses to community crime problems. 6 Since entering
academic life, I have written about reforms that might improve
prosecutorial decision-making and reduce prosecutorial contributions to
erroneous convictions. I have been accused by more than a few of my
former prosecutor colleagues of having "crossed over." But when I am
asked by current colleagues why I bother defending prosecutors, why I
bother making excuses for them, why I bother arguing for reforms
aimed at ethical prosecutors because so few are ethical, even I have to
ask myself: Why do I bother? If I bristle at the language of fault, and
occasionally even ponder withdrawing from encounters that subject me
to it, I can only guess how the rhetoric of fault must affect current
prosecutors.
Yet I do not have to guess.
Joshua Marquis, long active in the National District Attorney's
Association, gives us some idea when he mocks a "conventional
wisdom" permeated by the portrayal of prisons "chock-full of doe-eyed
innocents who have been framed by venal prosecutors and corrupt
'7
police officers with the help of grossly incompetent public defenders."
Although Marquis has conceded that the criminal justice system is a

275 (2009).
4 Prosecutor Mike Nifong was disbarred for his ethical violations during the prosecution of
Duke lacrosse players. The players were eventually exculpated from rape accusations and the
charges against them were dismissed. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case,
Innocence, and False Identifications:A FundamentalFailure to "Do Justice," 76 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1337, 1338-58 (2007); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors,89 B.U. L. REv. 1, 11-12
(2009).
5 Nina Shapiro, Judge Betty's Revenge, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Aug. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.seattleweekly.com/2009-08-19/news/judge-betty-s-revenge (profiling Hon. Betty B.
Fletcher).
6 For scholarship discussing community-based prosecution, see Anthony V. Alfieri, A
Colloquium on Community Policing: Community Prosecutors,90 CAL. L. REv. 1465 (2002);
Barbara Boland, Community Prosecution: Portland'sExperience, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN
EMERGING FIELD 253-77 (David R. Karp ed., 1998); Alafair S.Burke, Unpacking New Policing:
Confessions of a Former Neighborhood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2003);
Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (2002)

(same).
7 Joshua Marquis, Op-Ed, The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2006, at A23.
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"work in process" that needs "constant improvement," he is unmoved
by empirical evidence demonstrating the conviction of the innocent. 8 In
fact, he finds comfort in the data, believing they establish an
impressively low error rate and prove that the public "should be far
more worried about the wrongfully freed than the wrongfully
convicted."9 Is this prominent prosecutor's interpretation of the
problem inevitable, or could it be a consequence of his perception that
wrongful conviction reformists are attempting to "delud[e] the public
into believing that the police and prosecutors are trying to send innocent
people to prison"? 10
This Article explores the rhetoric that the wrongful conviction
literature invokes to discuss prosecutors. 1' Separate from the empirical
question of how widespread intentional misconduct is among
prosecutors, this Article questions the efficacy of fault-based rhetoric in
a world in which prosecutors see wrongful convictions as statistical
anomalies, their antagonists (like Mike Nifong) as uncommonly bad
apples, and themselves as ethical lawyers. 12 The wrongful conviction
literature's dominant rhetoric about prosecutors-a rhetoric of fault-is
counterproductive because it alienates the very parties who hold the
power to initiate many of the most promising reforms of the movement:
Fault-based discourse is especially misplaced in the
prosecutors.
discussion of the disclosure of evidence to the defense, where reformists
call upon prosecutors to disclose more evidence than the constitution or
ethical regulations require. In contrast, a "no-fault" rhetoric that
emphasizes how even ethical prosecutors might inadvertently contribute
to wrongful convictions carries the potential to fold prosecutors into the
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Scholars and commentators have questioned whether the wrongful conviction literature has
placed disproportional rhetorical emphasis on cases of factual innocence. See, e.g., Lawrence C.
Marshall, Litigating in the Shadow of Innocence, 68 U. PITT. L. REv. 191, 194-95 (2006) (noting
the role that wrongful convictions have played in the capital punishment movement, but arguing
that "condemning the innocent is just one small part of what is wrong with the death penalty");
Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (summarizing criticisms of
the "innocence movement" and arguing that "innocentrism" advances criminal justice discourse).
Andrew Siegel has argued that the wrongful convictions movement should move to a "new front"
of discourse that focuses on structural impediments to justice, such as indigent defense systems,
plea bargaining practices, docket control mechanisms, and prosecutorial incentive regimes, rather
than evidence-based claims, such as faulty eyewitness testimony and false confessions. Andrew
M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposalfor a Third Generationof Wrongful
Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1219, 1222-30 (2005). This
Article focuses exclusively on the discussion of prosecutors in the wrongful conviction literature.
12 while the misconduct of disbarred prosecutor Mike Nifong has provided no shortage of
material for scholars, see supra note 4, the National District Attorneys Association has called his
handling of the rape allegations against Duke University lacrosse players "an aberration." Laura
Parker, Trial This Week for Prosecutorin Duke Case; Mike Nifong to FaceEthics Charges, USA
TODAY, June 10, 2007, at 3A.

2122

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:6

movement while simultaneously pressuring them to initiate self-focused
reforms.
I.

WHY PROSECUTORIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE
INNOCENCE MOVEMENT MATTERS

As commentators have proposed reforms intended to prevent
erroneous convictions, 13 many have concluded that traditional litigation
is often unable to reach the type of investigatory and discretionary14
errors that most commonly contribute to wrongful convictions.
Instead, some of the most common and potentially transformative
suggestions for reform, even during the investigatory stages of a case,
would either require or be assisted by prosecutorial participation. For
example, scholars have suggested reducing the likelihood of false
confessions through improved interrogation techniques 15 or the
mandatory videotaping of interrogations, 16 reforms that are more likely

13 Exonerations through DNA evidence have enabled lawyers to identify the factors that most
commonly contribute to erroneous convictions: mistaken eyewitness interrogations, false
confessions, flawed science, inadequate defense lawyering, reliance on unreliable informant
evidence, and governmental error such as the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense. JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000) (examining

exoneration cases and determining that the most prevalent contributing factors were mistaken
eyewitness identifications, police and prosecutorial misconduct (including failures to disclose
exculpatory evidence), flawed science, inadequate lawyering by defense counsel, false
confessions, and unreliable informants); Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J. Matheson,
Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata Patil, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95

J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542-45 (2005) (discussing factors that contribute to erroneous
convictions); Robert Carl Schehr, The Criminal Cases Review Commission as a State Strategic

Selection Mechanism, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (2005) ("[Llegal scholars have
identified six leading causes of wrongful conviction: police and prosecutorial misconduct, false
eyewitness identification, false confession, junk science, ineffective assistance of counsel, and
snitch testimony."); The Innocence Project, The Causes of Wrongful Conviction,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand (last visited June 25, 2010) (citing eyewitness
misidentification, unreliable science, false confessions, police and prosecutorial misconduct,
informant and snitch testimony, and "bad lawyering" as causes of wrongful convictions).
14 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 125 (2008) (noting
that recent reforms to prevent and identify erroneous convictions "represent[] one of the most
significant efforts to reform our criminal procedure in decades, and it largely has not originated in
the courts").
15 See, e.g., Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision

in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 378-80 (suggesting reforms to police interrogation
techniques based on Great Britain's Police and Criminal Evidence Act). See also THE
INNOCENCE COMM'N FOR VA., A VISION FOR JUSTICE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 54-59 (2005)
[hereinafter A VISION FOR JUSTICE], available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/
press/reports/pdfs/ 17241 .pdf (providing recommendations for improving interrogation procedures
to reduce risks of wrongful convictions).
16 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparencyand Participationin Criminal Procedure,81 N.Y.U.

L. REv. 911, 958 (2006) (asserting that the videotaping of police interrogations "could improve
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to be implemented with prosecutorial support. Prosecutors could also
push for reforms to eyewitness identification procedures 17 and
implement procedures to improve their reliance on informant
testimony. 18
A noteworthy portion of the current literature focuses not on errors
during the investigatory stage of a case, but specifically on the broad
discretion of prosecutors and the ways prosecutorial decision-making
can affect the risk of erroneous convictions.' 9 However, due to
concerns about separation of powers, courts are typically reluctant to
intrude upon prosecutorial discretion. 20 Accordingly, many of the
reform proposals that seek to affect the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion must be implemented voluntarily by prosecutors, either
institutionally or individually. For example, scholars have proposed
that prosecutors' offices adopt incentive systems that would measure
prosecutorial performance based on ethical conduct instead of
conviction rates. 2' They have called for increased transparency in

monitoring and credibility"); Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial
Interrogations:Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127 (2005).
17 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation, and the
Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 271, 301-02 (2006) (discussing
prosecutor-led reforms of eyewitness identification procedures).
18 See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Brady and JailhouseInformants: Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 619, 632-42 (2007) (proposing ways prosecutors could improve the quality of
informant testimony, including the creation of an internal handbook to guide prosecutorial
discretion, the creation of guidelines to assess the reliability of jailhouse informants, and the
implementation of open file discovery); Myma S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and
the ProsecutorialEthics of Offering Testimony by JailhouseInformants and Dishonest Experts,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1448 (2007) ("Self-regulation by prosecutors ofjailhouse informants
can work...."); Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors "Doing Justice" Through OsmosisReminders to Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 105-12 (2008)
(recommending prosecutorial creation of a databank to track records of cooperating witnesses and
the top-down creation of a culture that promotes "justice" as a means of improving the quality of
prosecutorial reliance on informants).
19 See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN

PROSECUTOR (2007); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between ProsecutorialMisconduct and
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 407
(2006) ("Practically speaking, the prosecutor is the first line of defense against many of the
common factors that lead to wrongful convictions."); Zacharias & Green, supra note 4, at 17
(noting prosecutorial involvement in many of the factors that contribute to erroneous
convictions).
20 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (asserting that separation of
powers concerns complicate any attempts to establish a rigorous standard for obtaining discovery
in selective prosecution actions).
21 See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 846 (2000) (recommending
that professional advancement in prosecutors' offices "should be based on richer measures of
compliance with the 'do justice' standard, rather than simply on conviction rates"); Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons of Los
Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 305, 320-21 (2001) (suggesting that prosecutors be rewarded
for identifying police misconduct); Tracey L. Meares, Rewardsfor Good Behavior: Influencing
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873-

2124

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:6

prosecutors' institutional policies and individual decisions. 22 They have
encouraged prosecutors to adopt internal standards to guide their
discretionary decision-making. 23 They have suggested that prosecutors
24
create internal committees as a check on each other's decision-making
and to review questionable cases 25 and claims of innocence. 26 And
perhaps no reform proposal is raised as often as the call for increased
education about prosecutors' special ethical obligations, 27 how their
decisions might contribute to erroneous convictions,2 8 and how they can
75 (1995) (proposing financial incentives to reward prosecutors who avoid overcharging); Daniel
S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: ProsecutorialResistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84

B.U. L. REV. 125, 172 (2004) (advocating incentives for prosecutors to respond to postconviction claims of innocence).
22 See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49

How. L.J. 475, 494 (2006) (noting that review of prosecutorial decisions "will be ineffective
without transparency"); Bibas, supra note 16 (arguing for increased transparency throughout the
criminal justice system); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:Independence, Power, and

the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 461-62 (2001) (suggesting that public disclosure of
prosecutorial policies "would promote prosecutorial accountability and public confidence in the
criminal justice system"); Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 391 (encouraging prosecutorial
transparency as a means of neutralizing cognitive bias); Medwed, supra note 21, at 177-78
(suggesting increased transparency in prosecutorial policies).
23 See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57 (1971); Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in CriminalLaw, 95

CAL. L. REv. 383, 440-41 (2007) (recommending internal case review and self-regulation by
prosecutors as ways to remedy systemic problems); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1562 (1981). But see Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L.

REv. 275, 289-96 (2004) (questioning whether internal training, oversight, and regulation by
prosecutors is sufficient to regulate prosecutorial misconduct leading to erroneous convictions).
24 See Bandes, supra note 22, at 493-94 (advocating "[r]eview mechanisms.., at every level
of decision-making" that should perform a critical "'naysaying' function"); Darryl K. Brown, The
Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise ofAccuracy in CriminalAdjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV.

1585, 1620-21 (2005) (recommending that higher-level prosecutors act as a supervisory, internal
check on prosecutorial decision making); Alafair S. Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision
Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1621 (2006)
[hereinafter Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making] (suggesting "fresh look" reviews

by additional prosecutors); Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 388 (advocating multiple levels of
case review as "another check against tunnel vision").
25 See Medwed, supra note 21, at 126-27 (describing internal committees to review cases
resting upon the testimony of a single eyewitness); Robin Topping, Panel Puts Justice Before
Prosecution, NEWSDAY, Jan. 8, 2003, at A21 (describing such a committee in Nassau County,
New York).
26 See Medwed, supra note 21, at 175-77 (suggesting the creation of specialized postconviction units to review innocence claims); Peter Neufeld, Legal and Ethical Implications of
Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 639, 641 (2001) (noting that

"increasingly, progressive-minded prosecutors around the country are setting up their own
'innocence projects' and citing several examples).
27 Medwed, supra note 21, at 170-71 (advocating continuing education about ethical
obligations of prosecutors).
28 See Bandes, supra note 22, at 494 ("[T]raining of both supervisory and lower level
personnel must explicitly address the dynamics of tunnel vision."); Burke, Improving
ProsecutorialDecision Making, supra note 24, at 1616; Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 374

("[P]rosecutors and judges should be educated about the causes of, and correctives for, tunnel
vision."); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:A Conceptual Framework, 15
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improve the quality of their decision-making. 29
The voluntarily participation of prosecutors is especially important
Current
in the area of disclosures of evidence to the defense.

constitutional law imposes only a narrow obligation on prosecutors to
disclose. Under Brady, prosecutors are required to disclose only
evidence that is both exculpatory and material. 30 Even if evidence
"might" affect a case's outcome, it is not necessarily material under the
Court's due process jurisprudence. 31 Instead, evidence is material "only
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. '32 Ethical rules governing prosecutors go beyond Brady and
call for disclosure of all evidence favorable to the defense. 33 However,

the prosecutor may not realize that a piece of evidence is favorable to
the defense if she does not know the defense's theory of the case or the
34
facts that might be known to the defense.

AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 258 (1988); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalismof Prosecutors
in DiscretionaryDecisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1533-34 (2000) (advocating education
regarding the role of conscious and unconscious bias in charging decisions); Thomas P. Sullivan,
Keynote Address: Reforming Eyewitness Identification, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.
265, 268 (2004) ("We should also support initiatives to train detectives, prosecutors, and judges
about confirmatory bias or tunnel vision, which creates the risk of wrongful charges and
convictions.");

STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S

COMMISSION

ON CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT 20 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commissionreport/chapter_02.pdf (Commission Recommendation 1) (suggesting that both prosecutors and
defense lawyers in capital cases receive training on the dangers of tunnel vision or confirmation
bias); FPT HEADS OF PROSECUTION COMM. WORKING GROUP, DEP'T OF JUSTICE CAN., REPORT
ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2004), http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/deptmin/pub/pmj-pej/pmj-pej.pdf (recommending education for prosecutors about tunnel vision).
29 See Burke, Improving ProsecutorialDecision Making, supra note 24, at 1618 (advocating
practice of "switching sides" to neutralize cognitive bias in prosecutors); Findley & Scott, supra
note 15, at 371-72 (advocating mechanisms to encourage counterargument throughout
investigation and prosecution); Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Truth, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 309, 342, 348 (suggesting that prosecutors be trained to approach cases with "a
healthy skepticism" and "to assume an active role in confirming the truth of the evidence of guilt
and investigating contradictory evidence of innocence"); Medwed, supra note 21, at 170
(proposing increased training of prosecutors to reduce their resistance to post-conviction
innocence claims).
30 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that prosecutors must disclose
evidence to the defense when it is "material either to guilt or to punishment").
31 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-10 (1976) (rejecting such a standard).
32 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
33 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004) (requiring prosecutors to
make "timely disclosure... of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other
government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the
offense, or reduce the punishment"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) & cmt. 3
(2004) ("[A prosecutor must] make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and,
in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.").
34 See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting ProsecutorialDisclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 513 (2009)
[hereinafter Burke, Revisiting ProsecutorialDisclosure] (noting that prosecutors may not have
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Accordingly, several scholars have called for open-file discovery
in which prosecutors disclose all known evidence to the defense. Openfile discovery clearly goes beyond what is required by either the
constitution or ethical rules. 35 Although many have advocated changes
36
in the governing doctrine to make open-file discovery mandatory,
prosecutors-either individually or institutionally--can disclose more
than required by law. 37 A growing number of offices already employ
open-file discovery on their own initiative, 38 and many scholars have
recognized that open-file disclosure is more likely to be implemented by
prosecutors voluntarily than through a formal change in law. 39 And, as
the requisite knowledge to recognize the exculpatory value of evidence); Margaret Z. Johns,
Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 53, 147-48 ("Marginal
evidence-viewed through the eyes of defense counsel-might be the key to unraveling the case
and exonerating the accused."); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old
Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 569 (noting that prosecutors may
be unable to evaluate the materiality of evidence when they are unaware of the defendant's
version of events); Tom Stacy, The Searchfor the Truth in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1393 (1991) ("A prosecutor's lack of information about the planned
defense and partisan inclinations impede her from making an accurate and objective assessment
of the evidence's effect on the outcome.").
35 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109 (1976) (rejecting standard requiring prosecutors to disclose
evidence that "might" affect a jury because such a standard would amount to an open-file
discovery requirement).
36 See Victor Bass, Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 112, 113 (1972) ("[T]he prosecutor's entire file should, except in special cases,
be open to defense inspection."); Burke, Revisiting ProsecutorialDisclosure, supra note 34, at
513-14 (proposing a prophylactic rule requiring open-file disclosure to protect core due process
right defined by Brady); James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
2030, 2145-56 (2000) (proposing federal legislation encouraging states to opt in to procedures
required in capital cases, including open-file discovery); Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory
Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarmentof Mike Nifong: The CriticalImportance of
Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 262, 307-08 (2008) (emphasizing the
importance of broad and concrete discovery requirements); Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late:
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal
Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1153-54 (2004) (arguing in favor of open file discovery as a
prophylactic rule to protect the right to counsel).
37 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (1976) ("[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful
questions in favor of disclosure.").
38 See Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and
Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213, 234 (2007); Bennett L. Gershman, State
Constitutionalization of Criminal Procedure and the Prosecutor's Disclosure Obligations, 18
WESTCHESTER B.J. 101, 104 n.17 (1991) (suggesting liberalization of criminal discovery rules);
William Bradford Middlekauff, What Practitioners Say About Broad Criminal Discovery
Practice, 9 CRIM. JUST. 14, 55 (1994) (reporting that approximately three quarters of federal
prosecutors stated in a 1984 survey that they turn over more evidence than legally required and
that forty-two percent used an open file policy); Prosser, supra note 34, at 593-94 (summarizing
evidence showing that both individual prosecutors and numerous jurisdictions report the use of
open file disclosure); Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement
of the Duty of Prosecutorsto Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 926
n.539 (1997) (noting adoption of open-file discovery by Oklahoma prosecutors).
39 See Joy, supra note 18, at 641 (2007) (recommending voluntary adoption of open file
discovery as "[tihe surest way to meet and exceed Brady disclosure obligations"); Maximo
Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practiceand Reform of ProsecutorialAdjudication in
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this Symposium explores, prosecutors, more than any other parties in

the criminal justice system, can improve compliance with applicable
disclosure guidelines-whether required by law or voluntarily
implemented-by improving the disclosure process, maintaining a
system and culture that values a fair process, training and supervising
40
prosecutors accordingly, and self-policing.
II.

THE PREVAILING RHETORIC OF FAULT

While prosecutorial participation in many of the innocence
movement's most important reforms is essential, the literature on
prosecutorial decision-making is dominated by a language of fault.
When examining the ways that prosecutorial decisions contribute to
wrongful convictions, scholars and commentators have generally
attributed bad prosecutorial decisions to widespread prosecutorial
"misconduct" that is symptomatic of a deeply flawed prosecutorial

culture.4 ' In the language of fault, prosecutors care more about winning
their cases than serving as neutral ministers of justice. 42 Rather than
ensure that convictions are obtained fairly and the innocent protected,
prosecutors place undue emphasis on their win-loss ratios and "keep
43
personal tallies" of their conviction rates to advance their own careers.

American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 274 (2006) (noting that "the most
promising avenue" for broadening disclosure duties in the context of plea negotiations was at the
level of not only statutes and rules of evidence and ethics, but also prosecutorial guidelines). But
see Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games ProsecutorsPlay, 57 CASE W.
RESERVE L. REV. 531, 544-46 (2007) (warning of the "opportunities for gamesmanship" under
even open file policies).
40 See generally Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations:
What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943 (2010).
41 See Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 734 (1998); Bennett L. Gershman,
Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121 (1998); Peter J.
Henning, ProsecutorialMisconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REv. 1, 10-20
(1999); Andrew M. Hertherington, ProsecutorialMisconduct, 90 GEO. L.J. 1679 (2002); Meares,
supra note 21, at 890 ("Prosecutorial misconduct is readily apparent to any lawyer who keeps
abreast of appellate review of criminal convictions."); Medwed, supra note 21, at 174.
42 The unusual role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system is not that of a zealous
advocate, but as a minister ofjustice. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2002)
(stating that the prosecutor "has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of
an advocate"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (stating that a prosecutor's
duty "is to seek justice, not merely to convict"); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEF. FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) (same).
43 See Kenneth Bresler, '7Never Lost a Trial": When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal
Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541 (1996) (criticizing prosecutors who "keep
personal tallies .. . for self-promotion"); see also Meares, supra note 21, at 882 (describing the
"desire to 'win'" as "a central characteristic of prosecutorial culture"); Medwed, supra note 21, at
134 (noting "the emphasis district attorneys' offices place on conviction rates").
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With a lack of "moral courage," 44 prosecutors contribute to wrongful
''45
convictions because of routine "overzealousness.
The language of fault similarly permeates the discourse
surrounding the discussion of prosecutorial disclosure of evidence to the
defense. Advocates of expanded discovery rights for defendants portray
prosecutors as valuing conviction rates over justice. Motivated by the
accolades, bragging rights, and future career advancements that come
with high win-loss records, the prosecutors described in much of the
traditional Brady literature intentionally, knowingly, or at least
recklessly withhold potentially exculpatory evidence, playing "games"
with a doctrine that allows them to maximize their conviction rates my
gambling with justice. 46 From this perspective, a critical flaw in Brady
is the doctrine's entrustment of the disclosure process to wily
prosecutors who rationally conclude that they can withhold exculpatory
evidence with impunity because the odds favor them at every stage of
47
the process.
Under the prevailing narrative, self-interested prosecutors know
they are their own gatekeepers. 48 When faced with potentially
exculpatory evidence, they withhold it, knowing there is little chance
that the evidence will ever come to light and therefore little chance that
their decision to withhold will ever be challenged. 49 Even in the rare
44 See Gershman, supra note 29, at 350.
45 See Fisher, supra note 28, at 204-13 (describing factors that cause prosecutors to pursue
cases "overzealously"); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,53 U. PiTT. L. REV. 393,
458 (1992) (arguing that "the present ethos of overzealous prosecutorial advocacy" is
"ingrained"); Judith L. Maute, "In Pursuit of Justice" in High Profile Criminal Matters, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2002) ("Overzealous prosecutors may become too closely aligned
with... witnesses who are willing to shade or falsify their testimony in order to obtain a
conviction.").
46 See Gershman, supra note 39 (comparing prosecutorial disclosure practices to game
playing).
47 See Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor'sEthical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in
Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1379 (2000) (noting lack of
incentives for prosecutors to ensure that police have disclosed exculpatory evidence to them);
Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 715 (2006)
(arguing that Brady invites prosecutors to "withhold with impunity" due to a "rational belief' that
the appellate court will affirm the defendant's conviction); Weeks, supra note 38, at 870 (arguing
that Brady creates incentives to withhold evidence).
48 See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of
ProsecutorialDiscretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 391, 393-97 (1984)
(criticizing the materiality standard for entrusting prosecutors to monitor their own compliance
with disclosure obligations); Stacy, supra note 34, at 1393 (same).
49 See Brown, supra note 24, at 1637 ("The Brady rule currently works poorly because
prosecutors decide both what is material and what is exculpatory .... [Oldds are that if a
prosecutor does not disclose it, the evidence will never be uncovered."); Capra, supra note 48, at
396; Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 351-52 (observing that Brady violations are brought to
light only "through some fortuity that usually occurs sometime after trial"); Gershman, supra note
47, at 687 ("Brady is... virtually unenforceable when violations are hidden."); Bruce A. Green
& Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating FederalProsecutors'Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 470 (2002)
(noting that prosecutors may fail to disclose exculpatory evidence because their misconduct
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event that the defense does eventually learn about the evidence, the

prosecutor is unlikely to suffer any repercussions. In general, few
criminal convictions are reversed on appeal. 50 This general trend holds
true for challenges based on the government's failure to disclose
evidence. A study by the Habeas Assistance and Training Project, a
resource for defense attorneys, examined forty years of federal and state
court cases and found only 270 cases in which convictions were
reversed or new trials granted because of the government's failure to
disclose evidence. 5' More recently, Professor Bibas examined 210
Brady cases decided in 2004 and concluded that fewer than twelve
percent of them succeeded. 52 Accordingly, prosecutors who withhold
exculpatory evidence can do so with confidence that a reversal of an
eventual conviction is unlikely. Finally, even in the rare event that
undisclosed evidence is discovered and the defendant's conviction

reversed, the prosecutor finds himself in no worse position than if she
had disclosed the exculpatory evidence in the first place. The Double
Jeopardy Clause does not protect the defendant against a second trial, so

the prosecutor can simply proceed with a retrial with the disclosed
53
evidence available to both sides.

"stands some chance of remaining secret"); Janet C. Hoeffel, ProsecutorialDiscretion at the
Core: The Good ProsecutorMeets Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1145 (2005) ("[B]ecause
[the prosecutor] has no obligation to disclose this evidence, it may never be discovered and,
therefore, will never make its way into an appeal of the conviction."); Andrew D. Leipold, How
the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1150
(2005) (noting the role of luck in determining whether the defense learns about withheld
evidence); Meares, supra note 21, at 909 (noting that it is "probably fair to say that many
instances of Brady-type misconduct are never discovered and hence never reported"); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference Matter So Much?, 68 FORDHAM.
L. REV. 1537, 1579 (2000) (noting that, in most cases, "withheld evidence will never see the light
of day," thereby preventing judicial review); Stacy, supra note 34, at 1393.
50 Scholars have noted the various reasons why appellate judges rarely reverse criminal
convictions. Overwhelmed with meritless appeals and habeas petitions, affirming convictions
become the habitualized norm. See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial
Gamesmanship Toward the Searchfor Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 143
(Carol Steiker ed., 2006) [hereinafter Bibas, Searchfor Innocence] ("[J]aded judges find it hard to
spot the occasional innocence needle in the haystack."); Hoeffel, supra note 49, at 1145-46
("[A]ppellate courts have shown themselves to be predisposed to upholding convictions").
Judges may also suffer from hindsight bias, causing them to see a conviction that has already
been obtained as the inevitable conclusion of litigation. See Bibas, Searchfor Innocence, supra,
at 143-44; Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1.
51 See Richard A. Serrano, Withheld Evidence Can Give Convicts New Life, L.A. TIMES, May
29, 2001, at Al (citing the Habeas Assistance and Training Project study).
52 See Bibas, Searchfor Innocence, supra note 50, at 144-45.
53 See Hoeffel, supra note 49, at 1146 ("[A] reversal simply calls for a retrial, so that the
prosecutor is put in essentially the same position he was in prior to the [Brady] error."); cf Adam
M. Harris, Note, Two Constitutional Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Double Jeopardy and
ProsecutorialMisconduct Under the Brady Doctrine, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 931 (2006) (arguing
that double jeopardy should prohibit retrial when a conviction is reversed because of a Brady
violation); David L. Botsford & Stanley G. Schneider, The "Law Game": Why Prosecutors

2130

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:6

Just as the prosecutor who gambles with the non-disclosure of
exculpatory evidence to maintain a high conviction rate takes little risk
with regard to her caseload, she is also unlikely to pay little price
personally. As a general matter, state disciplinary bodies rarely charge
prosecutors with misconduct. 54 Not surprisingly, then, prosecutors are
rarely charged or sanctioned, even when a failure to disclose material,
exculpatory evidence is subsequently discovered. 55 In one of the
leading studies of Brady violations, Professor Rosen surveyed state
legal disciplinary bodies across the country and found only nine
instances in which proceedings had been brought based on a
prosecutor's violation of his Brady obligations. 56 Of the forty-one states
that responded to his survey, thirty-five reported that they had never
filed a complaint against a prosecutor for violating Brady. 57 A
subsequent study by Professor Weeks revealed that only seven
additional proceedings based on allegations of Brady violations had
been commenced in the following decade. 58 If prosecutors are unlikely
to be disciplined for actual Brady violations, they are even less likely to
be disciplined for failing to disclose evidence that falls only under their
59
ethical requirements and not the constitutional standard of Brady.
Regardless of the prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct or the
inadequacy of current ethical regulations or disciplinary bodies to
sanction violations, 60 this Article questions the productivity of the
prevailing rhetoric of fault. When it uses the rhetoric of fault, the
innocence movement casts prosecutors as outsiders to its cause. By
treating prosecutors as "other," the language of fault invites prosecutors
to resist and disengage from the study and prevention of wrongful
Should Be Preventedfrom a Rematch; Double Jeopardy Concerns Stemming from Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 729 (2006) (same).
54 See Kenneth Rosenthal, ProsecutorMisconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case
Studies in an Emerging Jurisprudence,71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 889 (1998) (noting an "absence of
disciplinary sanctions against prosecutors, even in the most egregious cases"); Fred C. Zacharias,
The ProfessionalDisciplineof Prosecutors,79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 755 (2001) (noting the lack of
discipline for prosecutorial misconduct).
55 See Gershman, supra note 45, at 443-45 (noting the "failure of professional disciplinary
organizations to deal with ... misconduct"); Richard A. Rosen, DisciplinarySanctions Against
Prosecutorsfor Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 730-31 (1987) (asserting
that, despite widespread failures to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, prosecutors are
rarely subject to disciplinary proceedings or sanctions based on Brady violations).
56 See Rosen, supra note 55, at 730.
57 Id. at 730-31.
58 See Weeks, supra note 38, at 881.
59 See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1593
("[C]ourts and disciplinary authorities do not sanction prosecutors for failing to disclose evidence
as required by the rule but not by other law.").
60 While the scholarly literature depicts widespread prosecutorial misconduct, Joshua
Marquis of the National District Attorney's Association describes prosecutorial misconduct as
"more episodic than epidemic." Laura Parker, Court Cases Raise Conduct Concerns, USA
TODAY, June 26, 2003, at 3A.
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convictions.61 However, in large part because of the broad prosecutorial
discretion that the rhetoric of fault often condemns, prosecutors have a
tremendous amount of power to implement the institutional, cultural,
and personal reforms that the innocence movement has called for.

III.

THE ROOTS OF AN ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE

Prosecutors naturally resist the depiction of themselves as the
antagonists in the stories of the wrongfully convicted. Rather than
struggle against their obligations as ministers of justice, the
prosecutorial culture often embraces the "do justice" ethos. 62 For many
prosecutors, it is precisely the prosecutor's duty to do justice and
freedom from zealous advocacy on behalf of a client that draws them to
their profession. 63 By questioning prosecutors' commitment to justice,
the rhetoric of fault challenges the very identity of prosecutors and
allows prosecutors to believe that the wrongful convictions movement is
focused not on them, but only on a handful of outlier rogues. As a
consequence, the language of fault excludes the very actors most able to
implement the movement's reforms. 64
Prosecutorial participation in reform is more likely to result from
an inclusive rhetoric that recognizes that even virtuous prosecutors who
strive to do justice might inadvertently err. The basis of a "no-fault"
rhetoric for discourse on wrongful convictions could focus on structural
and cognitive impediments to neutral prosecutorial decision-making.
As an alternative to the language of fault, a no-fault rhetoric focused on
impediments to prosecutorial neutrality would avoid alienating
prosecutors and instead invite them to contribute, individually and
collectively, to the prevention of wrongful convictions. As an example
of how the use of no-fault rhetoric can alter a narrative framework, this
Part discusses reasons why even ethical prosecutors might fail to
61 See The Effect of State Ethics Rules on FederalLaw Enforcement: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 53 (1999) (testimony of John Smietanka, former
prosecutor) (stating that "[t]ime, money and, to some unfortunate extent, a cultural chasm"
prevent prosecutors from "meaningful participation" in bar activities).
62 See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
607, 608 (1999) (noting that federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York "in some
sense ... felt that they owned the concept" of doing justice).
63 See Alafair S. Burke, ProsecutorialPassion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REv. 183, 187 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, ProsecutorialPassion].
64 Empirical evidence suggesting that lawyers are especially resistant to feedback and
hypersensitive to criticism further suggests that fault-based rhetoric is unlikely to be effective
with prosecutors. Larry Richard, Herding Cats: The Lawyer PersonalityRevealed, ALTMAN
WElL REPORT TO LEGAL MANAGEMENT, Aug. 2002, http://www.lawmarketing.com/pages/
articles.asp?Action=Article&ArticlelD=350 (reporting that ninety percent of surveyed attorneys
demonstrated low "resilience" in a measure of personality traits, compared to only thirty percent

for the general public).
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disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense.
One structural impediment facing prosecutors is the Brady doctrine
itself. As a standard to govern a prosecutor's pre-trial obligation to
disclose evidence to the defense, the Brady doctrine is difficult to apply.
Requiring disclosure of evidence only if it undermines confidence in the
trial's outcome, the standard is phrased not from the perspective of an
attorney making pre-trial decisions, but of an appellate court
determining with the benefit of a trial record whether to grant postconviction relief.65 Accordingly, it requires prosecutors to imagine a the
record of a trial they have not yet started, and then ask whether in
hindsight the evidence at issue would undermine confidence in a
resulting conviction. Although some argue that ethical prosecutors can
avoid error by disclosing more broadly than required by Brady,66 some
prosecutors may be concerned that broad disclosure to advance the
protection of the innocent might actually conflict with their role as
ministers of justice. The prosecutor's unique role in the adversary
system has a "twofold" objective: to ensure that neither "guilt shall...
escape" nor "innocence suffer. ' 67 Although prosecutors must seek to
prevent wrongful convictions, they must also "use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one. ' 68 She cannot strike "foul" blows, but
she may strike "hard" ones. 69 By expecting prosecutors to serve as
discretionary gatekeepers of their own disclosure, Brady places
prosecutors in the untenable position of trying to serve competing and
70
sometimes inconsistent goals.
65 See Bibas, Search for Innocence, supra note 50, at 143 (noting that prosecutors "have
difficulty forecasting before trial what evidence will in retrospect seem to have been material");
John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50
EMORY L.J. 437, 471 (2001) ("It seems curious, to say the least, that a prosecutor has a
constitutional obligation before trial to disclose a category of information that cannot be defined
until after trial." (emphases added)); Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 352 ("[T]he Brady test
oddly imposes a retrospective analysis on decisions that must be made prospectively, pretrial.");
Green, supra note 59, at 1592 n. 101 (noting the difficulty of assessing the materiality of evidence
prospectively); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and ConstitutionalMirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 658 (2002) (asserting that the materiality
requirement results in "a somewhat odd and circular spectacle: a pre-trial obligation that is
defined through speculation on a post-trial result").
66 See Hoeffel, supra note 49, at 1142 ("If the good prosecutor were the ethical prosecutor, he
would disclose to the defense all information favorable to the defense, without hesitation.... If
in doubt, he would err on the side of disclosure."); Johns, supra note 34, at 147 (noting that
prosecutors "can simply err on the side of caution and disclose more evidence than is actually
required"); Sundby, supra note 65, at 660 (asserting that prosecutors are likely to disclose more
than what is required "to be on the safe side and out of a sense of ethical obligation").
67 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Susan S. Kuo & C.W. Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois
Disclosure, 38 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 695, 706 (2007) ("The quest for success can affect a
prosecutor's ability to objectively weigh the materiality of potentially exculpatory
evidence .... ); Samuel J. Levine, Taking ProsecutorialEthics Seriously: A Considerationof the
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Moreover, because prosecutors must make unilateral decisions
about whether to disclose evidence without reciprocal discovery from
the defense, they may not be able to recognize when a piece of evidence
is potentially exculpatory. 7' Evidence that appears neutral or even
inculpatory to the prosecutor might nevertheless be exculpatory in the
context of evidence known only to the defense or the defense's theory
of the case. For example, seeming irrelevant details might add
corroboration to the defendant's version of the events. 72 The identity of
a witness who leads the police to inculpating physical evidence might
reveal that the witness has a grudge against the defendant and planted
73
the evidence.
The likelihood that a well-intentioned prosecutor will
underestimate the exculpatory value of evidence is only heightened by
cognitive biases that interfere with a neutral assessment of case
evidence. In contrast to the rhetoric of fault that dominates the
traditional literature on prosecutorial ethics, an emerging literature has
explored the effects of bounded rationality on the decision-making of
prosecutors. 74 Whereas prosecutors might hope and believe that they
are able to assess their cases neutrally and objectively, psychological
otherwise.
Cognitive psychologists
have
research
suggests
convincingly demonstrated that human decision making, rather than
Prosecutor'sEthical Obligation to "Seek Justice" in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 41
HOUS. L. REv. 1337 (2004); Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the
Interplay Between InstitutionalIncentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision
Making, 74 MO. L. REv. 999 (2009); Stacy, supra note 34, at 1393 (noting that prosecutors'
"partisan inclinations" can impede "an accurate and objective assessment" of evidence); Andrew
E. Taslitz, Wrongful Rights, 18 CRIM. JUST. 4, 11 (2003) ("[P]rosecutors faced with a duty to
disclose material exculpatory evidence may in good faith interpret that duty narrowly, for
prosecutors come to believe zealously in the guilt of those they accuse, inevitably coming to
embrace the virtues of his or her own position." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
prosecutor's ability to balance her competing obligations is further undermined when most of the
defendants she has charged are actually guilty, making it difficult to entertain the possibility of
innocence. See Fisher, supra note 28, at 208 (noting that prosecutors are typically isolated from
populations who might trigger empathy for defendants, while surrounded by populations "who
can graphically establish that the defendant deserves punishment, and who have no reason to be
concerned with competing values ofjustice").
71 See Johns, supra note 34, at 147-48 ("Marginal evidence-viewed through the eyes of
defense counsel-might be the key to unraveling the case and exonerating the accused."); Stacy,
supra note 34, at 1393 (observing that a prosecutor's lack of knowledge about the defense's
theory undermines her ability to assess the exculpatory value of evidence).
72 See Prosser, supra note 34, at 569 (noting that prosecutors may fail to recognize the
exculpatory value of evidence that would corroborate the defendant's version of events).
73 See Burke, Revisiting ProsecutorialDisclosure, supra note 34, at 513-14 (discussing a
hypothetical witness who frames a defendant).
74 See generally Bandes, supra note 22, at 479; Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463, 2496-2519 (2004); Burke, Improving
ProsecutorialDecision Making, supra note 24; Burke, ProsecutorialPassion, supra note 63, at
195-200; Findley & Scott, supra note 15; Medwed, supra note 21, at 140-41; O'Brien, supra note
70; Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have to Do with It?: A Commentary on Wrongful
Convictions andRationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1315, 1327.
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being perfectly rational, is systematically and predictably skewed by
cognitive biases. 75 More specifically, cognitive scientists have
documented the human tendency for people to interpret evidence
through the lens of their existing beliefs.
Because of selective
information processing, people tend to accept at face value information
that is consistent with their beliefs, while devaluing inconsistent
information. 76 In the law enforcement context, scholars and
commentators refer to this phenomenon in police and prosecutors as
"tunnel vision. ' '77 Once police and prosecutors believe that a suspect is
guilty, their theory of guilt may taint their assessment of the case
evidence, causing them unconsciously to accept inculpatory evidence
without question, draw inculpatory inferences from ambiguous
78
evidence, and disregard potentially exculpatory evidence.
75 See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:

HEURISTICS

AND BIASES (Daniel

Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION:
MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE (1999); RICHARD E. NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE:
STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE

MIND WORKS (1999); see also Cass R. Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1175 (1997) (noting that although "[c]ognitive errors and motivational distortions may
press behavior far from the anticipated directions," human behavior is not "unpredictable,
systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social scientists").
76 See, e.g., Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, BiasedAssimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
77 See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 22, at 481; Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role
of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 428-29 (2009) ("Research on the causes
of wrongful convictions has produced a large body of scholarship describing the problem of
'tunnel vision,' the unconscious cognitive biases that plague both police and prosecutors.");
Brown, supra note 24, at 1600 (noting that confirmation bias in police and prosecutors can distort
criminal investigations); Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 292; Kuo & Taylor, supra note 70, at
706-07 (discussing the "tunnel vision" phenomenon); Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice
from the "Laboratory" of Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and
Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 847, 849 (2002) (examining evidence from Canada and
Britain demonstrating the role that prosecutorial tunnel vision plays in wrongful convictions);
Medwed, supra note 21, at 140-41 (discussing prosecutorial deference to police with tunnel
vision); Raeder, supra note 74, at 1327 ("[T]he tunnel vision problem has been widely noted in
wrongful conviction cases. Officers and prosecutors either don't realize the significance or
accuracy of exculpatory evidence or on occasion affinmatively conceal it because they are
convinced of the suspect's guilt.").
78 In earlier pieces, I have set forth in greater detail the ways that cognitive bias might alter a
prosecutor's assessment of the exculpatory value of evidence. See Burke, Improving
Prosecutorial Decision Making, supra note 24, at 1607; Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial
Disclosure,supra note 34, at 496; Alafair S. Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to
Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 518 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Neutralizing
Cognitive Bias]. Other authors have discussed this phenomenon, as well. See Keith A. Findley,
Innocents at Risk. Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON
HALL L. REV. 893, 899 (2008) ("[P]olice and prosecutors-as human beings-are likely, once
they have identified a suspect or formed a theory of guilt, to seek confirming evidence and not
seek disconfirming evidence."); Randolph N. Jonakait, The EthicalProsecutor'sMisconduct, 23
CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 552, 559 (1987) (noting a prosecutor's "natural tendency to acquire all the
evidence that inculpates the person selected as guilty while all other evidence is ignored" and that
"[tihe natural inclination is not to see inconsistent or contradictory evidence for what it is, but to
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Consider how these decisional tendencies might affect the
prosecutor's assessment of whether to disclose evidence to the defense.
Because the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty, she is likely
to weigh the evidence against him as strong. In contrast, she is likely to
view evidence that might be helpful to the defendant's lawyer as
unreliable, distracting, or immaterial. As a consequence, she may
conclude that the evidence is not material and exculpatory, or perhaps
not even exculpatory at all. 79
CONCLUSION

Universal cognitive bias, the prosecutor's competing dual roles,
and the awkwardness of the Brady doctrine itself collectively provide
the roots of a no-fault explanation for prosecutorial failures to disclose
exculpatory evidence. No-fault rhetoric that assumes prosecutors are
trying to protect innocence, but which recognizes the reasons why they
might accidentally err, is more likely to activate discussion with
prosecutors than fault-based rhetoric. The traditional rhetoric of fault
assumes that prosecutors who contribute to wrongful convictions do so
because they care insufficiently about claims of innocence and their
roles as ministers of justice. Because of that rhetoric, prosecutors who
view themselves as ethical might conclude that the wrongful
convictions movement is either focused on a small minority of
indifferent prosecutors or falsely assuming that most prosecutors are
indifferent. They might disengage from the evolving study of and
conversation about the prevalence and causes of wrongful convictions,
further isolating themselves from contrasting viewpoints that might
neutralize decisional biases. As a consequence, they may fail to
recognize the possibility that, despite their best intentions, they might
inadvertently contribute to an erroneous conviction. 80
Shifting the discourse of the wrongful conviction movement from
fault-based rhetoric is also more likely to persuade prosecutors to
implement disclosure reforms. For example, a prosecutor called upon
categorize it as irrelevant or a petty incongruity"); Sundby, supra note 65, at 655 (noting that
cognitive biases could impede prosecutors from recognizing materiality); Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68

FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 945 (1999) (noting that prosecutors "get wedded to their theory and
things inconsistent with their theory are ignored").
79 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably

Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317,
believes a defendant is guilty may view potentially
which defense counsel may make mischief').
80 See O'Brien, supra note 70, at 1010 ("False
the system's failure-often involve honest mistakes

1375 (1997) (arguing that a prosecutor who
exculpatory evidence "as a 'red herring' with
convictions-the most dramatic examples of
by ethical investigators and prosecutors.").
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to adopt an open-file discovery policy as a means of preventing
intentional Brady violations 8' might deem such a policy unnecessary,
assuming that she always discloses as required. However, prosecutors
who perceive the distorting influences of cognitive bias and a
prosecutor's conflicting dual roles might be attracted to the clarity
82
provided by open-file discovery.
Finally, avoiding fault-based rhetoric may actually place more
pressure on prosecutors to participate in reform than fault-based
rhetoric. Whereas fault-based discourse grants ethical prosecutors
license to disengage, no-fault rhetoric invites prosecutors to learn about
the causes of wrongful convictions, to study how prosecutors can help
prevent erroneous convictions, and to implement education programs
and institutional policies to reduce the likelihood of error. As
Professors Findley and Scott have observed, "tunnel vision in the
criminal justice system exists not despite our best efforts to overcome
these cognitive biases and institutional pressures, but because of our
deliberate systemic choices. '83 Because of the discretion they are
afforded, prosecutors have a unique power to alter those systemic
choices. If prosecutors are invited to participate in reform with no-fault
rhetoric, yet ignore the risks that even ethical prosecutors might
contribute to wrongful convictions, they do so at their peril. A
continued failure to take steps to prevent accidental error would only
84
bolster the fault-based arguments that prosecutors currently resist.
I began this Article with an anecdote and will close with one as
well. I wrote this Article in connection with a Symposium of scholars,
defense lawyers, and prosecutors to discuss their viewpoints on Brady
and other disclosure obligations. In her opening comments, Symposium
organizer Ellen Yaroshefsky implored participants to avoid what I have
called here fault-based rhetoric. One of the other attendees was a
prosecutor who was once my supervisor and remains my friend. The
day before the Symposium, he told me he was preparing himself to be
81 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
82 See O'Brien, supra note 70, at 1035-47 (calling for less prosecutorial discretion in the
disclosure process to minimize bias caused by a prosecutor's role as advocate); Findley & Scott,
supra note 15, at 390 (advocating the expansion of criminal discovery as a means to counter
tunnel vision); Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 237, 272-74
(advocating open discovery in criminal cases to mitigate harms caused by police and
prosecutorial tunnel vision); see also A VISION FOR JUSTICE, supra note 15, at 67-68
(recommending open file discovery to reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions).
83 Findley & Scott, supra note 15, at 333.
84 See Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias, supra note 78, at 529-30 (noting that prosecutors'
failure to take steps to mitigate the effects of cognitive bias bolsters the argument for fault-based
reforms); Raeder, supra note 18, at 1452 ("It is time for prosecutors to take a more proactive
stance to curtail practices that contribute to wrongful convictions. Strengthening their ethical
policies will remind prosecutors about the values that first attracted them to public service, and
help to allay the cynicism of those who think that obtaining convictions is the only raison d'etre
of their calling.").
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beaten up by the defense bar and the academics for the next two days.
After the first day of the Symposium, he said to me, "That wasn't so
bad." And when the Symposium was over, he brought his materials
home with him. "There's some stuff in there I want to add to our office
policy."
No-fault rhetoric might actually work.

